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Social Body, Racial Body, Woman’s Body. 
Discourses, Policies, Practices from Wilhelmine to 
Nazi Germany, 1912-1945 
Cornelie Usborne  
Abstract: »Geburtenpolitik in Deutschland, 1912-1945: Diskurse, Politik und 
Praxis«. This article compares the responses to the declining birthrate by three 
very different regimes in Wilhelmine, Weimar and Nazi Germany. In their in-
tent these policies were markedly different: just before and during the First 
World War a declining birthrate symbolised national decline, sapping national 
progress and military power and the central aim was to boost fertility almost at 
any price; eugenics was not yet a major influence on official Wilhelmine po-
licy. In the wake of the devastation reaped by the lost war and also influenced 
by the depression at the end of the 1920s the democratically elected govern-
ments of the Weimar Republic attempted to ‘rationalise’ reproduction to suit 
the prevailing socio-economic circumstances and the belief in modernity in in-
dustry and everyday life. They favoured ‘fewer but better children’ but their 
policies remained fragmented and heavily contested; lawmakers tried to bal-
ance individual rights and collective interests, welfarism and eugenic concerns. 
In contrast, Nazi leaders developed a comprehensive and sophisticated system 
of selective reproduction based on racial prejudice; legal safeguards to protect 
the rights of individuals were ruthlessly dismantled. Material and ideological 
inducements to boost the birthrate benefited only ‘Aryans’ and healthy Ger-
mans. A series of extremely repressive measures were introduced: on the one 
hand they were meant to curb the breeding of the ‘unfit’, like Jews, gypsies, or 
those considered congenitally diseased and, on the other, they aimed to curb 
individual birth control by those deemed ‘fit’. 
But of course the picture is more complicated. If we compare official popula-
tion programmes with their implementation at the local level and also with the 
reproductive strategies employed by ordinary women and men, a more subtle 
picture emerges about the regimes which is marked by both fundamental 
changes but also striking continuities. 
Keywords: declining birthrate; racial hygiene; eugenics; rationalisation; selec-
tion; racism; repressive measures; local implementation; women’s reproductive 
behaviour. 
 
This essay discusses how during the first four decades of the twentieth century 
three very different regimes in Germany attempted to regulate the size and 
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balance of population to accord with their particular economic, social and po-
litical beliefs. Throughout the nineteenth century science had increasingly been 
applied to exploring reproduction, starting with the laws of heredity to patterns 
of fertility and infertility. Theories of heredity by Charles Darwin and Francis 
Galton in Britain and August Weismann, Ernst Haeckel a.o. in Germany led to 
a completely new approach to fertility: while it was formerly ruled by the un-
predictable forces of nature it could, at least so it was argued by the end of the 
nineteenth century, be placed firmly under human control. Such optimistic 
belief in the progress of science meant that the issue of reproduction became a 
subject of high politics and the widening sphere of public opinion. The problem 
of continuity and change in recent German history is always a compelling one, 
particularly if the authoritarian Wilhelmine Germany is contrasted with the 
much more liberal Weimar Republic and the latter in turn is compared with the 
Nazi dictatorship. Yet, despite the obvious ruptures there was also much that 
linked the different population policies across the chronological divide 
(Weindling 1989; Usborne 1992). I argue here that it is not sufficient to com-
pare population policies without taking account of their implementation which 
had often unforeseen, undesired and contradictory effects. Moreover, it would 
be wrong to think of the population policies of the different regimes as fixed 
and monolithic; rather they were the object of often fierce contestation and 
negotiation by various pressure groups and the population at large. Last but not 
least, I contend that we need to appraise how official programmes affected the 
procreative practices of young women and in turn were affected by them. 
Women of reproductive age were after all the main targets of state intervention, 
yet they are far too often absent from contemporary as well as historians’ ac-
counts.1 
It was the recognition of rapid demographic change at the turn to the twenti-
eth century, especially the fear of a steeply declining birthrate in the years 
before the First World War which propelled the population question into the 
arena of high politics. This constituted a remarkable change from a century 
earlier. At the beginning of the nineteenth century fear of overpopulation 
dominated the debate on fertility, most powerfully expressed by the Reverend 
Thomas Malthus in his 1789 Essay on the Principles of Population who 
warned that the rapidly increasing population was outstripping economic re-
sources. He suggested the family size, particularly that of the lower classes 
should be regulated such that families do not produce more children than they 
can support. Malthus argued that family limitation would be achieved by either 
‘positive’ checks, which raise the death rate, such as hunger, disease and war-
fare, or by ‘preventative’ checks which lower the birth rate, such as postpone-
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ment of marriage and celibacy (moral restraint), or by immoral acts like abor-
tion, birth control and prostitution.  
Like most other European countries, Germany had experienced a demo-
graphic growth on a scale never before witnessed. Her population more than 
doubled between 1800 and 1900, from nearly 25 million to over 56 million 
(Statistisches Reichsamt 1933, 15; Bergmann 1992, 27; Weindling 1989, 242). 
But at the end of the nineteenth century national fertility was on the decline in 
Germany like in the rest of Western Europe. Now a high birthrate had come to 
be associated not with economic misery, as Malthus had warned, but rather 
with industrial and military power. Between 1876 when it was at its peak and 
the 1910s the German birthrate had decreased from 42.6 to 31.7; it continued to 
decline sharply during the First World War and throughout the Weimar Repub-
lic until it reached an all time low of 14.7 in 1933, considered the lowest in the 
world (Knoedel 1974, 5). In less than two generations, but within the memory 
of only one, the demographic transition from high to low fertility had been 
completed. The cause was not fewer or delayed marriages nor a decline in 
illegitimacy but fewer children within marriage. The main differences between 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century was that families were much 
smaller, children were born later within marriage to older women and, because 
they bore fewer children, women were younger when their families were com-
plete. Unlike Malthus’ suggestions of ‘positive’ or ‘preventative’ checks, the 
new breed of German population planners thought in terms of social policy, 
economic incentives, health education and legal suppression of birth control to 
stimulate the birthrate and eugenics to prevent the birth of children considered 
to be of inferior genetic quality. As we shall see below, the belief in social 
engineering was to be proven wrong: despite considerable efforts the reproduc-
tive behaviour of Germans could not easily be influenced. 
Interestingly, it was not statisticians but doctors who first raised the alarm in 
Germany. Demographers had registered a declining birthrate since the 1890s 
but they either took this to be a positive development or as nothing to worry 
about. The medical profession, however, thought differently. They adopted the 
notion that low fertility was a pathology which had attacked the social body 
and that doctors were the one to determine the cure. With the shift from pre-
vention of epidemic diseases to maternity and infant welfare, many doctors 
working as family practitioners or as state officials had first-hand experience of 
changing reproductive behaviour. In contrast to economists who tended to offer 
often contradictory interpretations, doctors were less reluctant to prescribe 
measures to influence individual sexuality. This was part and parcel of the 
process of medicalisation of all social strata which had accelerated with the 
introduction of compulsory health and accident insurance schemes in the 
1880s. Family doctors had witnessed their patients increasingly using birth 
control and feared that Germany was now adopting the ‘two-child system’ 
(Zweikindersystem) of France where it had aroused official panic ever since the 
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census of 1856 had so starkly revealed its effects (Bergmann 1992, 28). What 
is more, doctors also worried that artificial birth control, formerly the privilege 
of the professional classes, was increasingly also adopted by the working 
classes. Proletarian families used contraception, especially coitus interruptus, 
but more and more also sought to terminate their unwanted pregnancies and did 
so despite heavy legal sanctions (Usborne 1997; Polano 1917; Marcuse 1913). 
The imperial penal code of 1871 prescribed penal servitude for all forms of 
abortion and in 1872 advertisements and display of contraceptives were also 
outlawed. As a response to the rapidly expanding black market of contracep-
tives the latter law was strengthened in 1900 (Bergmann 1992, 30; cf. Woycke 
1988, 137-139). 
In the climate of international competition in the decade before the First 
World War there was not only an arms race among Western European nations 
but also a race to increase the birthrate. According to the Social Darwinist 
ideology so prevalent at the time, the concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
demanded a high national fertility which in turn signified the ability to win at 
war. In Germany doctors were determined to contribute to the national task of 
reversing the Geburtenrückgang, the declining birthrate. To this end they sug-
gested a plethora of social policy schemes to stimulate fertility ranging from 
special child insurances and other financial incentives to strengthen the ‘will to 
a child’. Left-leaning medics championed social hygiene which departed from 
a liberal concept of individual health and instead held collectivist notions of a 
healthy family, society and the future generation. In this scheme preventive 
medicine and an environmental approach to health were key. But the idea that 
the state should take at least some responsibility for family expenses pervades 
most medical literature on the fertility decline. It was a radical departure from 
previous ideology held by economists and Malthusians who considered family 
fortunes to be the responsibility of the individual and failing that, charity (Us-
borne 1992, 10 onwards). The medical profession had their first chance to 
influence state policy directly when in 1911 the Prussian Minister of the Inte-
rior charged the Prussian Medical Council to examine whether there were any 
‘signs of physical degeneration in our population’ to explain the fertility de-
cline and if so how to reverse this trend. This initiative led to a far-reaching 
inquiry into causes of and remedies for the decline of the birthrate. It estab-
lished Prussia as the leading state to formulate a national population policy. 
The initial report of 1912 and the final version of 1915 framed the approach 
and the language of future official responses to the declining birthrate by Wil-
helmine, Weimar and National Socialist governments. But in their intent these 
policies were markedly different: the central aim of the Imperial government 
was to boost fertility almost at any price. Less important was eugenics, or racial 
hygiene, as it was also called in Germany. It was hailed as a new science of 
heredity and was based on the belief in a hierarchy of human worth and in the 
possibility to improve the race biologically through selective breeding. It was 
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energetically pursued by the medical professions and a number of other popula-
tionists, supported by a number of national and international organisations; yet 
it did not yet constitute a major influence on official policy (cf. Dienel 1995, 
84). Only in the wake of the devastation wreaked by the First World War and 
again by the economic depression at the end of the 1920s did the democrati-
cally elected governments of the Weimar Republic attempt to ‘rationalise’ 
reproduction to suit the prevailing economic hardship as well as accord with 
the belief in modernity in industry and everyday life. They favoured ‘fewer but 
better children’; but because of a lack of consensus their policies remained 
fragmented and heavily contested. Weimar lawmakers tried to balance individ-
ual rights and collective interests, welfarism and eugenic concerns. In contrast, 
Nazi leaders developed a comprehensive and sophisticated system of selective 
reproduction based on a racist ideology; legal safeguards to protect the rights of 
individuals were ruthlessly dismantled and material and ideological induce-
ments to boost the birthrate benefited only healthy ‘Aryan’ Germans and dis-
criminated against all others who were considered undesirable. A series of 
extremely repressive measures was introduced: on the one hand they were 
meant to curb the breeding of the ‘unfit’, like Jews, gypsies, or the congenitally 
diseased and, on the other, they were designed to stop any attempt at interfering 
in the reproductive process of the ‘fit’. 
Wilhelmine Germany – Children at Any Price 
Despite the rapidly declining birthrate the population was still growing fast on 
the eve of the First World War which was mostly due to a significantly de-
creasing mortality rate. Between 1900 and 1910 the population had grown from 
c. 56 to c. 65 million and the mortality rate fallen from 22.3 in 1891/1900 to 
15.0 in 1913 (Marschalck 1984, 146, 156). But the medical profession who was 
gaining more and more influence in official policy-making construed the de-
clining birthrate as a social disease affecting the body politic and called for 
determined action. The result was the 1911 Prussian official inquiry into causes 
of and remedies for the decrease in fertility. It was driven by a new enthusiasm 
for population statistics and influenced by the optimistic belief that fertility 
trends were susceptible to external influence. The official report was not pub-
lished until July 1915 but a semi-official publication in 1912 revealed the most 
important proposals, a mixture of incentives, coercion and moral directives 
against the ‘pernicious’ influences of Neo-Malthusians, socialism and the 
women’s movement (Bornträger 1912). Incentives included an array of eco-
nomic aid for marriage and large families, such as tax relief, housing schemes, 
child allowance, nursery care and an additional vote for fathers of many chil-
dren. Sanctions ranged from a bachelor tax to an extended military service for 
single men, from confinement of ‘inferiors’ to asylums to sanctions against 
prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and contraception and abor-
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tion. Between 1915 and 1917 a Prussian inter-ministerial commission worked 
on the development of a detailed programme to reverse the fertility decline. It 
laid considerable emphasis on improving public health by promoting social 
hygiene and maternal and child welfare measures, thereby giving a strong 
stimulus to social policy. 
But during the First World War and martial law repressive measures were 
easier to implement and also considerably cheaper. Military authorities prohib-
ited not only the display and advertisements of contraceptives but also their 
import and sale which had previously been attempted but had proved impossi-
ble. Moreover, police surveillance was increased. In a continuation of the dou-
ble standard, however, men as soldiers were issued with condoms, which were 
exempt as a prophylactic against STD whereas female appliances such as the 
diaphragm were banned. The Prussian Medical Council and the Reich Health 
Council worked together to publish guidelines for general practitioners and 
clinicians restricting terminations of pregnancies. These were henceforth only 
acceptable on very narrowly defined medical grounds, if the pregnancy consti-
tuted an immediate and serious risk to the woman’s health or life and if this 
risk could not be averted by any other means. This did, however, not mean that 
therapeutic terminations were now declared legal (Usborne 1992, 21). The core 
of war-time pronatalism was undoubtedly three government sponsored bills: 
firstly, to strengthen the control of prostitution and increase penalties for 
spreading STD; secondly, to suppress the use of contraceptives and abortifa-
cients, i.e. means to induce an abortion; and thirdly, to tighten the laws con-
cerning voluntary sterilisation and criminal abortion. 
The first bill was tabled because STDs was believed to be rampant amongst 
the troops and to contribute to the declining birthrate since they could cause 
infertility and infant mortality (cf. Sauerteig 1999). The second bill sought to 
outlaw not only advertisements for birth control but also their manufacture, 
import and sale, except when pharmacists supplied doctors for bona fide rea-
sons. For the first time, abortifacients were included in the ban, as was public-
ity for abortion services and any publication which contained any reference to 
birth control. The third bill was hurriedly tabled in June 1918 as a direct re-
sponse to two sensational trials in the previous years. One involved a well-
known professor of medicine from the university of Jena accused of carrying 
out multiple sterilisations on his women patients, the other pertained to a much 
loved Munich woman gynaecologist for routinely and openly inducing miscar-
riages on a great number of her women patients. The authorities also believed 
that the upsurge in abortions during the war meant that they contributed most to 
the decline of the birthrate. 
There was an important ethical dimension to the population question, espe-
cially since both the established Protestant and the Roman Catholic Church had 
strong links to the government and took an active part in the formation of offi-
cial policy. So also did a whole plethora of pronatalist and moral right societies 
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which sprang up before and during the war, an indication of the extent to which 
fertility decline was seen as a political/moral problem (cf. Usborne 1987, 99-
112). Uppermost was the concern that birth control would promote promiscuity 
and persuade women to seek pleasure or pursue careers in preference to their 
patriotic duty of child-bearing (Usborne 1988, 389-416). But in general, Wil-
helmine pronatalism had no perceptible successes. Needless to say, the First 
World War destroyed any hope of concerted government action to maintain a 
high birthrate and thereby secure a strong population number. Fritz Burgdörfer, 
who headed first the Bavarian, later the Reich Statistical Office claimed that 
the first total war in history had cost the German nation between 12 and 13 
million people, or one fifth of the total population. According to his calcula-
tions this deficit was made up as follows: the demographic impact of territorial 
losses (c. 6.5 million); 2 million killed in action; the effects of the blockade 
(0.75 million); influenza death of 1918 (100,000); and children never born (3-
3.5 million) (Burgdörfer 1929, 13-15). None of this could be compensated by a 
pronatalist welfare programme which, at any rate, had largely been discarded 
when the war broke out; nor could it the declining fertility be reversed by social 
discipline and punitive measures like the war-time ban on contraceptives. In 
Germany, as elsewhere circumstances were simply not conducive to increased 
reproduction. If anything, the experience of the violent destruction of men’s 
and women’s bodies and the disruption of the gender order during the war 
mobilised many women to fight for reproductive rights. 
Weimar Germany – Fewer but Better Children 
In the social and economic upheaval after the First World War and buoyed by 
the influence of Social Democracy in the Weimar Republic maternal and child 
welfare programmes largely replaced the previous crude pronatalist policies. 
This happened despite a moral panic in the wake of the lost war which centred 
on a perceived radical change of sexual mores and a widespread alarm, espe-
cially among the political right, at the wartime losses on the battlefield and the 
continuing fall of fertility which, it was feared, could not make up for them. 
The political left shared some of these concerns but most socialists rejected the 
old repressive approach and instead favoured positive measures to help social 
reconstruction. A well-known socialist slogan proclaimed that there could be 
no Gebärpflicht (an obligation to reproduce) without the state’s Nährpflicht (an 
obligation to feed its children). Thanks to the campaigns of left and left-leaning 
pressure groups an impressive network of private and state sexual advice cen-
tres opened their doors all over Germany and provided birth control informa-
tion as well as contraceptives, often free of charge (Usborne 1992, 121 on-
wards; cf. Von Soden 1988). Numerically more important, however, was a 
popular movement for birth control organised by lay leagues for sex reform. 
They consisted of a bewildering array of political activists belonging to anar-
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cho-syndicalism, sex reformers, Neo-Malthusians, pharmacists and other small-
time entrepreneurs who were adept in avoiding police surveillance, able to 
work underground and trading itinerantly. In terms of its size and working-
class membership this movement was probably unparalleled anywhere in the 
world. These lay leagues had mass appeal because of their shrewd commercial 
exploitation of the restrictive legal and medical practices and because they 
were able to provide a cheap and non-judgmental proletarian self-help network 
which was a real alternative to academic medicine (Usborne 1992, 123f; cf. 
Grossmann 1983, 265-293; Grossmann 1995). In 1926 members of the left 
with the support of liberal members of the Reichstag achieved an important 
reform of the 1871anti-abortion law. The amendment increased penalties com-
mercial abortions and those performed without consent or which had ended in 
death. But a woman who had her unwanted pregnancy terminated no longer 
faced penal servitude but simple gaol, often just a few days or even just a small 
fine. In 1927 the Supreme Court permitted abortion on strict medical grounds, 
making Germany, together with the Soviet Union, the country with the most 
liberal abortion policy in the developed world (Usborne 2005). 
The new spirit of caring in the republic was the result of socialists working 
with the impressively large number of women politicians in the Reichstag, 
Land diets and local councils to replace the old-style repressive pronatalism 
with welfarism. Proposals for a comprehensive social policy included improved 
wages, working conditions, maternal and child welfare, health care and the 
legal status of unmarried mothers and their children. Despite the volatile eco-
nomic and political climate a surprising number of these schemes were actually 
realized. The war-time maternity allowance was made permanent as early as 
December 1918 and family allowances, on the agenda already during Imperial 
Germany, became a reality in the republic in as far as they were paid to all 
public sector employees. Other policies implemented included a ‘family wage’ 
according to family status (but this had to be disbanded after the inflation pe-
riod); a comprehensive state programme of maternal and child care; maternity 
benefit; and protective legislation for women workers. The statutory right to 
maternity leave was introduced in Germany in 1927 in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Washington Convention of 1919 of the International 
Labour Organisation. This had been first considered in October 1922 but was 
delayed because of lack of funds. But the government was driven to act by a 
petition presented to the Reichstag in 1925 by the German Textile Workers’ 
Union, representing the largest female German workforce. They pointed to 
very serious effects of industrial work on pregnant women or mothers and their 
young children. The law of 1927 extended maternity leave from eight to twelve 
weeks (more if there were medical complications), allowed two half-hour peri-
ods per day for breast-feeding and, crucially, protected expecting and recent 
mothers from dismissal during the time of maternity leave. This was the most 
important welfare law in the area of family policy of the republic; it meant that 
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Germany was the first industrial country to ratify and implement the Washing-
ton Convention. The law, however, proved less effective for women in practice 
than in theory, especially as it did not cover women employed in agriculture, 
domestic service or as home workers but also because many women could 
simply not afford to take their full entitlement when benefits payments were 
lower than the usual wages. Nevertheless, the significance of this regulation 
should not be underestimated, both in the way it signalled how seriously policy 
makers engaged with maternal and child welfare and because of its undoubt-
edly positive effects on thousands of women. Most other European countries 
lagged far behind Germany’s provisions in this area (Usborne 1992, 49-50). 
Advances in other welfare schemes, such as ante-natal, infant, youth and 
family care were also impressive during the Weimar Republic. They were 
helped by the new municipal health initiatives, often driven by the socialist 
ideals of a modern system of democratic health provision. Open health care 
dispensed from clinics rather than hospitals proved cost effective and reached a 
much wider public. For example, in 1926 the progressive health insurance 
funds in the socialist municipality of Berlin opened their state-of-the art poly-
clinics (Ambulatorien) for expectant and recent mothers. They provided the 
kind of comprehensive services social reformers could elsewhere only dream 
of, ranging from organising home or hospital deliveries to providing advice on 
birth control (both contraception and terminations), from helping with housing 
to child care, even job provision for unemployed parents. Thus these clinics’ 
care began with the pregnant woman and ended caring for the entire family 
(Usborne 1992, 51; Grossmann 1995, 46 onwards; Weindling 1989, 350-351). 
The principle that prevention through education was the best form of social 
medicine also informed the many official initiatives of health education initi-
ated by socialist doctors and politicians who believed in social hygiene to solve 
the population problem. A newly founded Reich Committee for Health Educa-
tion promoted publicly funded exhibitions often travelling from town to town. 
Endowed with the most up-to-date technology of visualising medical issues 
including films and slide shows they were to alert especially the younger gen-
eration to the dangers of STD, TB, alcoholism and hereditary diseases. In 1926 
the socialist doctor and member of the Reichstag, Julius Moses, organised a 
National Health Week aimed at public hygiene and health education and in the 
same year a hugely successful exhibition in Düsseldorf, the Gesolei, informed 
about the role of health care, social welfare and physical education for the well-
being of the individual and the community at large. These enterprises stressed 
not only the rights of individual citizens to proper health provision but increas-
ingly also their obligations to maintain their health in the interest of society, a 
development which had important implications for subsequent eugenic 
schemes (Weindling 1989, 378-80, 411 onwards; Usborne 1992, 107-108). 
The new emphasis on ‘fewer but better children’, i.e. on a qualitative rather 
than a quantitative population policy, meant that many welfare measures were 
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targeted especially at healthy mothers and their children and could therefore be 
rated as positive eugenic measures. In fact, during the republic the conviction 
that advances in scientific medicine and hereditary science could improve the 
genetic quality of the future generation, was very popular among widely differ-
ing social groups ranging from the political left and right and the medical pro-
fession to civil servants, and from the Churches to feminists and sex reformers. 
They all espoused eugenics as a modern, progressive scientific and humanitar-
ian solution to the population question in difficult times. As a counterweight to 
social welfare measures which benefited all, whether considered of ‘desirable’ 
stock or not, the adoption of negative eugenics was debated, e.g. policies to 
prevent the births of children born with congenital conditions such as venereal 
diseases. In the event only two significant schemes were officially imple-
mented: firstly, from 1920 onwards leaflets were handed out by registrars to 
encourage prospective couples to obtain certificates of a clean bill of health 
before marriage. They warned of the congenital nature of TB, STD and mental 
diseases as well as abuse of alcohol, morphine and cocaine. Secondly, from 
1923 eugenic marriage centres were established to carry out the appropriate 
medical examinations. These clinics were sponsored by local authorities but 
also by welfare organisations. It was typical of Weimar population policies that 
the original intention of such clinics to promote eugenic awareness, especially 
amongst the ‘feckless proletariat’, was subverted by the recipients of such 
advice. The working classes much preferred sex advice centres where they 
could get hold of the information they really wanted, namely help with birth 
control. By the early 1930s most municipal marriage clinics, except those run 
by the Catholic Church, succumbed to popular pressure and gave contraceptive 
advice. It was also symptomatic of Weimar policy that schemes like the above 
invited cooperation rather than enforced conformity. This was despite consid-
erable pressure from various factions to ensure selective breeding by compul-
sory measures. The inherent tension between the interests of the individual and 
of the community was never resolved in the Weimar Republic. This meant that 
negative eugenics remained fragmented and entirely voluntary. For example, as 
early as 1921 Max Hirsch and Agnes Bluhm, both medical members of the 
Prussian Advisory Committee for Racial Hygiene, convinced the Prussian 
Health Council that those suffering from certain hereditary conditions should 
be prevented from reproduction. Hirsch specified these conditions as dementia 
praecox, epilepsy, feeble-mindedness, blindness, deaf-muteness and haemo-
philia. He also asserted that alcoholism, syphilis and TB could damage the 
future generation. He and Bluhm argued for the legalisation of eugenic abor-
tion, sterilisation and contraception, even for the ‘destruction of worthless life’. 
Their argument was both informed by economic as well a populationist con-
cerns. Like a number of other eugenicists Hirsch asserted that the number of 
‘incapable’ and ‘unfit’ people had dramatically increased during and after the 
First World War. As a result, so Hirsch contended, welfare provisions were 
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draining the public purse and the potential children of ‘degenerates’ would 
undermine the genetic health of society (Usborne 1992, 142-148; Weindling 
1989, 361-365). The repeated airing of what were portrayed as ‘progressive’ 
medical measures to bring about a solution to the population question and the 
welfare costs eroded much of the opposition to negative racial hygiene. It was 
finally the depression at the end of the Weimar era which ensured that propo-
sals to legalise eugenic sterilisation and eugenic abortion received increased 
backing, particularly from members of the medical profession, including many 
women doctors. 2 In 1923 and in subsequent years, a district health officer from 
Saxony campaigned for the legalisation of compulsory sterilisation of children 
born to parents who suffered from a variety of congenital problems, including 
controversially single mothers who could not identify the fathers of their chil-
dren. His proposals were consistently rejected by many of his medical col-
leagues, as well as by high-ranking civil servants and politicians who rated 
them as an unacceptable intrusion into the personal right of the individual and 
the family because of the act per se but also because of the uncertainty of 
eugenic diagnosis.3 But by the end of the 1920s, partly as a desperate measure 
in desperate times, partly because of the belief that eugenics had become a 
precise science, the idea of eugenic sterilisations was winning more support 
and the focus shifted away from the operation itself to the vexed question of 
consent. In 1929 even Catholic newspapers saw the value of such a measure 
and the operation seems to have been carried out in Saxony and elsewhere with 
impunity (Usborne 1992, 153). In July 1932 the Committee for Population 
Policy and Racial Hygiene of the Prussian Health Council proposed to the 
Prussian government that they legalise voluntary eugenic sterilisation. Similar 
proposals from other quarters reached the Reichstag. As a result the govern-
ment drafted a bill on eugenic policy which proposed the legalisation of volun-
tary sterilisation for people with congenital physical or mental illnesses. But 
before the Reichstag could seriously consider it in committee stage Hitler had 
assumed power. It took the newly established National Socialist government 
only six months to permit compulsory sterilisation on eugenic grounds as part 
of the law to ‘prevent hereditarily diseased offspring’ (Usborne 1992, 155; 
Woycke 1988, 152-153; Weindling 1989, 388-393). Despite the widespread 
support for negative eugenics towards the end of the republic many historians 
now agree that such a compulsory measure was unlikely to ever become law as 
long as Germany was still a democracy. Although the concepts of ‘voluntary’ 
and ‘compulsory’ sterilisation were not clear-cut in the discussions surrounding 
                                                             
2  Cf. Usborne 2002, 73-94, 87-88; women doctors showed that their first allegiance was to 
the profession, which had espoused eugenics, rather than to their, predominately female, 
patients. 
3  The president of the Reich health office, Bumm to the Reich Minister of the Interior, 1923, 
cited in Usborne 1992, 152. 
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the 1932 Prussian bill for eugenic sterilisation, in that it was meant to outlaw 
all voluntary sterilisation as birth control by those considered ‘fit’, the bill 
provided for at least formal consent of patients to be sterilised or their legal 
representative. Only under the Nazi dictatorship and with ‘the combined forces 
of medical, police, and legal powers in a terrorist state’ could such a bill be-
come official policy and the procedure be carried out forcible on thousands of 
victims (Grossmann 1995, 145; cf. Weindling 1989, 344; Bock 1986, 55-57; 
Noakes 1984, 75-94). 
In the face of innumerable economic and social problems, especially at the 
beginning and at the end of the republic, Weimar’s progressive welfare system 
could not persuade women and their partners to have more children. It was, 
however, not only economic pressure that dictated reproductive decisions. 
Easier access to contraception and abortion, increased social opportunities for 
women and New Women’s growing confidence in demanding fulfilment and a 
chance to make their mark as citizen of the new republic played their part The 
size of families was becoming steadily smaller. The average number of chil-
dren born per marriage fell from 4.7 after the First World War (for couples who 
had married before 1905) to a mere 3.1 during the Depression; and couples 
who married in the period of 1925-9 produced on average only 2.0 children 
(Spree 1984, 62). The determination of most young women and their partners 
to limit their fertility was helped by the liberal attitude towards sexuality; it was 
certainly not hindered by the various and mostly lukewarm negative eugenic 
schemes. These were widely discussed but had comparatively little impact 
since they remained resolutely voluntary. The public discourse of and official 
propaganda for racial hygiene, however, had a more important long-term ef-
fect. They fed directly into the racist policies of the Nazi government. Unfet-
tered by democratic concerns it could convert existing campaigns and the Prus-
sian sterilisation bill into compulsory racist and racial hygiene measures which 
proved fatal to all those who fell foul of the Nazi goal to create a pure and 
Aryan national community. 
Nazi Population Policy – The Apotheosis of Racial Hygiene  
Some continuities notwithstanding, 1933 constituted a radical policy break. 
Every single area of family policy was affected by Nazi racial ideology – from 
the regulation of marriage and divorce, maternity protection and birth control to 
guardianship, foster care and adoption.4 Most of the concessions for reproduc-
tive freedom granted during the Weimar Republic were reversed. Civil liberty 
                                                             
4  To cite just a few prominent examples of the vast array of publications: Czarnowski 1991; 
Czarnowski 1999, 238-256; Bock 1986; Weindling 1989, 489-490, 514; Schoppmann 1991; 
Pine 1997; Heinemann 1999; Mouton 2007; various articles in Herzog 2005. 
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safeguards were abandoned in the quest for total control over the individual 
body to ensure the physical regeneration after the ‘decadent era’ of the Weimar 
Republic. Punitive measures were tempered with financial support for those 
‘fit’ to reproduce. Social Democratic welfarism was to be replaced by a care-
fully targeted pronatalism. As early as the summer of 1933, grants to encourage 
marriage were issued to assist with new household expenditure; they could be 
paid back or they could be ‘babied off’ (abkindern). Originally conceived as an 
economic measure to entice women out of the labour market into the home, 
marriage grants turned into an eugenic instrument to test the genetic fitness for 
marriage; a certificate had to be obtained from a doctor proving genetic suit-
ability and ‘Aryan’ descent. Failed tests could lead to marriage bans and cou-
ples prohibited from marrying who lived in a concubinage could be punished 
(cf. Czarnowski 1997, 78-95, 79-83). Similar preconditions were applied to 
child allowances to promote large families and to select single mothers for the 
Lebensborn, a network of residential homes for ‘valuable’ expectant and recent 
mothers. But at the same time as healthy ‘Aryan’ Germans were financially 
rewarded for marrying and having children they also faced more stringent 
controls and penalties if they opted for voluntary birth control than ever before. 
In 1933 sexual advice and birth control centres were closed and most of their 
champions were driven into exile, although contraceptives themselves were not 
banned until 1941 when only military personnel were exempt (Grossmann 
1995, 166 onwards; Stephenson 2001, 38). Moreover, the regime tried every 
possible route to stamp out the practice of abortion and sterilisation as a 
method of fertility control among those considered ‘valuable’. As early as 1933 
newspapers were banned from printing advertisements for abortion services 
since it was believed that they had helped many thousands of women in the 
republic rid themselves of unwanted pregnancies. At the same time the liberali-
sation of the abortion law in 1926 was reversed; longer prison terms were pre-
scribed again for aborting women. Therapeutic abortion, although legalised by 
the Nazi regime for the first time, was significantly curtailed in 1935 by new 
restrictions and arduous bureaucratic processes. Furthermore, in 1936 surveil-
lance of clandestine abortions was stepped up by imposing a mandatory regis-
tration of all terminations, miscarriages and premature births and introducing 
new police and Gestapo surveillance methods. In 1943, at the height of the 
Second World War when losses on the battlefield were mounting dangerously, 
the regime went as far as introducing the death penalty for abortionists who 
were ‘habitual offenders’. Gabriele Czarnowski has found evidence that this 
was in fact carried out several times (Czarnowski 1999, 242-243, 248). 
While fertility control by ‘valuable’ individuals was to be ruthlessly sup-
pressed, ‘undesirable’ individuals like Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, ‘asocials’ 
and the ‘congenitally diseased’ were to be prevented from procreating by a 
whole array of racial laws: compulsory abortion, sterilisation and segregation 
on eugenic grounds; marriage was banned for the genetically ‘worthless’, from 
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1943 also on account of infertility and age difference within marriage, specifi-
cally when women were older than husbands. Compulsory eugenic sterilisation 
was legalised in July 1933 and eugenic abortion permitted by a simple adminis-
trative directive in the same year. Doctors were assured of impunity and en-
couraged to perform terminations until all hereditarily diseased persons were 
sterilised. Women’s consent was not sought and there was no time limit for the 
operation to be performed. In 1935 eugenic termination was incorporated into 
the sterilisation law to enable the two operations to be combined as much as 
possible. Even though women did in theory have to agree to have their preg-
nancies terminated, in practice many operations were performed without it. 
From 1943 mass abortions were also inflicted on Polish and Russian forced 
labourers in Germany (Czarnowski 1999, 242, 244). During the Nazi rule, as 
many as 400.000 compulsory sterilisations were performed, roughly half on 
men and half on women. Operations were carried out on persons suffering from 
any of nine conditions: hereditary feeble-mindedness, schizophrenia, manic-
depression, hereditary epilepsy, Huntington’s chorea, congenital blindness, 
congenital deafness, congenital malformations and alcoholism (Weindling 
1989, 525). Moreover, an unknown but probably very large number of sterilisa-
tions of ‘racial enemies’ were also carried out in concentrations camps and 
other Nazi institutions; the same fate befell an unknown number of forced 
labourers and ethnic groups such as gypsies and Jews (Bock 1986, 241; Pom-
merin 1979, 71-79). As Gisela Bock has pervasively argued, compulsory steri-
lisation affected women worse than men since for women it proved a much 
more traumatic and risky operation and indeed more women died as a result of 
it (Bock 1986). Women were also more easily targeted since a deviant sexual 
behaviour could easily lead to a diagnosis of ‘feeble-mindedness’. The majority 
of female sterilisation victims were single women whose enforced infertility 
probably diminished their marriage prospects. Moreover, the reasons why they 
were sterilised in the first place often meant they were handed over to a psychi-
atric home and after 1937 also to concentration camps or the army of forced 
labour (Heinemann 1999, 30). 
The 1933 law led to a massive state campaign to enlighten the public about 
the advantages of racial hygiene; it invigorated the careers of many medical 
men involved in the administration and adjudication in the numerous hereditary 
courts and created a huge bureaucracy responsible for genealogical surveys and 
censuses. A central data bank attached to all local health offices was set up to 
gather hereditary statistics. These were to be collated all over Germany and 
eventually a biological data bank was to emerge for the whole population. In 
subsequent years the sterilisation law was radicalised to target other so-called 
deviant groups and in a decree of June 1935 compulsory castration was permit-
ted for homosexuals. Pressure from anti-Semitic factions led in September of 
the same year to the infamous Nuremberg laws to ‘protect German blood and 
honour’ when sexual relations and marriage between Jews and gentiles was 
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forbidden. Racial hygiene concerns by the public health lobby led to the decree 
in October 1935 proscribing marriage of the congenitally ‘diseased’ with 
healthy partners. Soon the marriage ban was extended to all those who had 
been sterilised (unless their partners were also sterilised); those suffering from 
‘psychopathy’ or compulsive criminality; and those afflicted by chronic dis-
eases such as TB or STD. The effort to protect society from an unhealthy future 
generation led to a growing list of diseases which were considered to be harm-
ful to the family, such as asthma, diabetes, obesity and blood diseases 
(Weindling 1989, 530-533). 
As a result of the pressure of various groups of racial hygienists, racist poli-
ticians and bureaucrats it was decided in 1938 to exterminate newborn children 
and others suffering from congenital diseases. In the autumn of that year the 
practice was extended to include ‘mercy killing of all those considered to be 
suffering from incurable diseases’. Euthanasia, the most extreme form of nega-
tive eugenics was never legitimised by law but solely by order of Hitler as the 
supreme power deciding on life and death. The SS urged the broad range of 
racial policies to be extended from the congenitally ill to the incurable, the 
antisocial and the unproductive as well as to Jews, gypsies and social problem 
groups, and to subject them also to deportation, forced labour and extermina-
tion. But whereas eugenic sterilisation was regulated by tribunals, euthanasia 
killings were shrouded in secrecy and hidden behind a plethora of euphemisti-
cally-named organisations. In the autumn of 1941 the programme was offi-
cially stopped because of public protest but medical killing continued under a 
different guise: the racially ‘undesirable’ like Jews, mixed race children, the 
weak and sick, ‘antisocials’ and ‘delinquents’ were gassed in what became the 
death camps, others perished by systematic starvation, hard labour or fatal 
medicines (Weindling, 544, 548-551; cf. Linton 1986, 45-79). 
Complexities and Continuities 
Of course in their inhumanity and ferocity Nazi policies cannot be likened to 
policies of the preceding regimes. But despite these obvious policy breaks the 
picture is more complicated. If we differentiate between official population 
programmes and their implementation, take into account the opposition from 
feminists and other pressure groups as well as the reproductive strategies em-
ployed by ordinary women and men, a picture emerges which is marked by 
both fundamental changes but also striking similarities and continuities.  
To begin with, there was an important gap between policies and their im-
plementation in all three regimes. For example, in the Wilhelmine era many 
welfare measures were abandoned during the war and the most extreme meas-
ures to curb birth control were defeated by the revolution of 1918. Many Wei-
mar social policies were shelved because of socio-economic upheaval; some 
welfare schemes became almost meaningless during the inflation (e.g. mater-
 155 
nity benefit) or Depression (e.g. paid maternity leave). Nazi pronatalism also 
suffered a serious setback when rearmament and the war economy demanded 
more women industrial workers and military service. Just as economic and 
political circumstances affected population policy, so did the difficulties of 
implementation on the ground. During all three regimes people at every level 
supported, rebelled against or ignored official rules regarding fertility policy. 
Even in the Nazi dictatorship when public discussion had been silenced, indi-
vidual judges, doctors, and social workers ignored orders when they offended 
their own principles or seemed to undermine communal interest. For example, 
despite popular support for the 1933 eugenic sterilisation law, Nazi policymak-
ers often met resistance, especially by religious health workers who would not 
identify candidates for sterilisation (Mouton 2007, 142). Or carers became 
emotionally attached to patients singled out for ‘mercy killing’ and protected 
them. In my own research on Cultures of Abortion in Weimar Germany I found 
a surprising continuity between the three regimes. For example, just like in 
Imperial and Weimar Germany where the so-called ‘dark figure’ of abortion 
was estimated to be many hundred times more than cases that came to light, 
under National Socialist rule, too, only a small proportion of putative criminal 
abortion cases was ever investigated because of lack of funds. There is also 
considerable evidence of many successful lay abortionists operating in Weimar 
Germany for a number of years; they were shielded from prosecution by the 
protective silence of the community they served. Similarly, I have unearthed 
court records of cases of midwives who had been performing terminations 
successfully for decades until they came to the notice of the police for reasons 
which are not known (Usborne 2007, chapter 6; Czarnowski 1999, 245). Czar-
nowski found that a midwife, executed in 1943 as a habitual abortion offender, 
had similarly been protected by her community for a long while until she fi-
nally was detected. Moreover, the harsh Nazi sentencing policy was in practice 
tempered by a number of amnesties. What is more, I found that during the early 
years of the Third Reich judicial practice resembled that of the Weimar Repub-
lic quite closely. Some judges condoned infractions against the abortion law 
and handed down surprisingly mild sentences (for aborting women and their 
accomplices alike) on the grounds of often spurious mitigating circumstances: 
the crime had taken place during the decadent Weimar years when minds were 
‘perverted and sensibilities warped’ or they had occurred in the early years of 
the Nazi rule when the new ideology had not yet had time to ‘enlighten’ the 
population (Usborne 2007, chapter 7). 
Feminist Responses and Women’s Practice  
Women’s bodies as the carriers of the future generation came to represent the 
ills of the social body. To cure the latter meant first and foremost policing 
female bodies during all three regimes. How did women react to this increased 
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state intervention? And was women’s social status enhanced once their repro-
ductive capacities had moved out of the private into the public sphere and 
become a matter of high politics? As discussed above this process began in the 
pre-First World War years when, as Elisabeth Domansky put it, states aimed no 
longer just on ‘out-producing’ but increasingly sought to ‘out-reproduce other 
nations’ (Domanski 1997, 427-464, 431). It continued during the protracted 
slaughter on the battlefields when the anxiety over Germany’s demographic 
survival produced a flurry of punitive legislation mainly targeted at women’s 
sexual behaviour. And in the wake of the First World War the Weimar welfare 
state sought to repair the wounds inflicted on the body politic by restoring the 
body female through improved social hygiene and financial support for moth-
ers and their children. Controversial schemes of selective breeding discussed 
during the republic were eagerly adopted under National Socialism and focused 
predominantly on women’s reproductive freedom. 
In her thought-provoking but controversial article on militarisation and re-
production during the First World War Domansky denied any benefits for 
women. She argued that the newly gained national importance of women’s 
procreative work ‘provided society with a new rationale and new tool for dis-
empowering women rather than endowing them with new power, as some 
nineteenth-century bourgeois feminists had hoped’. The reason for this was, 
she contends, that women were excluded from combat (unlike for example 
British women) and their value now lay exclusively at the home front as pro-
ducers of weapons and reproducers of soldiers’. Their new role as ‘mothers to 
the nation’ had, according to her, increased women’s subordination to men 
(Domanski 1997, 438). Yet, this negative judgement, as I have argued else-
where and will briefly trace here, ignored women’s heightened agency reacting 
to and shaping the national population discourse and the important civil gains 
they derived from this and the high profile of their reproductive work (Usborne 
2005). 
Leading members of both the bourgeois and proletarian women’s movement 
offered early on a spirited defence of feminist values which were usually at 
odds with official thinking. The unprecedented attempts to regulate individual 
sexual behaviour and family life in Wilhelmine Germany provoked a strong 
protest by the unusually united front of the women’s movement in the summer 
of 1918 when they demanded vociferously that the bill to outlaw contraception 
be scrapped. Some women leaders did not necessarily disagree that the birth-
rate should be stimulated but they sought to capitalise on the new importance 
of women’s reproductive abilities by demanding improved legal and social 
status for ‘the mothers of the race’.5 For left-leaning feminists, however, the 
decline in national fertility had many positive implications. It meant a funda-
                                                             
5  Gertrud Bäumer, speech in the Prussian House of Representatives, 1915, cited in Usborne 
2005, 135. 
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mental change in the power relationship between classes and between the 
sexes. Thus, in 1919, Adele Schreiber, radical feminist and sex reformer and a 
future Social Democratic member of the Reichstag was all for celebrating 
rather than bemoaning the demographic change. She called the phenomenon of 
the declining birthrate ‘the greatest, non-violent revolution’ by women and one 
which ‘put the key to the control of life firmly into the hand of mothers. Thus a 
woman enslaved becomes master and determines herself the fate of the family, 
the volk and humanity.’6 From 1920 she chaired the Reichstag Populational 
Policy Committee and continued to demand women’s right of reproductive 
self-determination not just on economic or health grounds but as an essential 
human right. Other women politicians of the left also made access to cheap, 
reliable and safe contraception and termination of unwanted pregnancies their 
focus in campaigns inside and outside parliament. Women doctors studied the 
issues within their associations and publications. Some were cautious about 
granting unlimited fertility control to women as a right and a small number 
called for more eugenic measures, including voluntary sterilisation. But many 
women doctors supported the left-wing campaigns and became determined 
advocates for women’s rights frequently becoming medical advisers in the 
network of birth control clinics spring up all over Germany after the mid-1920s 
(Usborne 2002). 
Ordinary women, too, took a dim view of any attempt to intervene in their 
fertility decisions and resisted en masse population planners’ pressure to breed 
more.7 The birthrate continued to fall and the use of contraception and abortion 
continued to rise. In the Weimar Republic this trend accelerated and by the end 
of it Germany boasted the lowest birthrate of any western country. The mar-
riage boom in the post-First World War years did not result in enough children 
to make up for the wartime losses; the peak in national fertility in 1920 was 
below that of 1913, the last year of peace. Despite heavy sanctions for abortion 
prescribed in the penal code of 1871 an increasing number of women continued 
to rid themselves of unwanted pregnancies. Abortions were estimated between 
200,000 and 500,000 p.a. immediately after the First World War and as many 
as one million by 1930, which meant the estimated number of terminated preg-
nancies exceeded the number of births recorded. Abortion became one of the 
most passionately debated politico/moral and health issues in the republic and 
the slogan used by the second wave women’s movement in the 1970s in the 
USA, Britain and the rest of western Europe, ‘My body belongs to me’ had its 
origins in German feminists’ battle cry of the Weimar Republic, ‘Your body 
belongs to you!’ Significantly for evidence of how women’s new sense of 
citizen rights was linked to reproductive rights, among the very first petitions 
                                                             
6  Bundesarchiv Berlin, Nl Adele Schreiber-Krieger, no. 60, 1919. 
7  Cf. the interviews conducted by the sexologist Max Marcuse in 1912 and 1916 and by 
Oscar Polano in 1916, cited in Usborne 1992, 26-28. 
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sent to the National Assembly in 1919 was that by a group of Berlin women, 
without any apparent party affiliations, to ‘curb coercive procreation in Ger-
many’ and to ‘decriminalise abortion, for single women and for mothers of 
three children.’8 A great number of similar petitions, many of them signed 
simply ‘by housewives’, followed suit. The success of the campaign to liberal-
ise the abortion law in 1926 and 1927 was due to such strong grass-root support 
by the newly enfranchised female population and the pressure exerted on par-
liament by numerous women politicians, doctors and sex reformers in their 
wake (cf. Usborne 2005). 
My recent research on abortion has also revealed women’s vociferous and 
remarkable Eigensinn, their stubborn insistence to reclaim their own body in 
the face of the attempt by doctors, lawyers, politicians and the Churches to 
impose their (bourgeois) norms of the meaning of conception, pregnancy and 
miscarriage and to devise rules for reproductive behaviour. These prescriptions 
were challenged more or less openly by women and their accomplices by their 
lifestyles and also their statements during police and court interrogations for 
criminal abortion. Proletarian women especially displayed alternative forms of 
knowledge and adhered to trusted older notions of fertility and procreation 
while at the same time applying modern techniques (Usborne 2007, chapters 5 
and 6). In Nazi Germany, too, women managed to control their own fertility in 
the face of draconian penalties for abortion. This is an important sign of sub-
version and of continuity as is the fact that the project to reverse the declining 
birthrate so energetically pursued in Imperial times and the Nazi era was never 
really successful. In fact, the aim of the Nazi regime to restore fertility to the 
high levels achieved before the First World War failed since during the Third 
Reich it never once reached even the levels of the early 1920s (25.9 in 1920, 
20.8 in 1925). True, fertility rose after 1933 but almost certainly not because of 
pronatalist policies; birthrates rose in every country, except France, once the 
Depression was overcome. The long-term trend was one of relentless decline. 
There is also impressive evidence of opposition to official policies by indi-
viduals during Nazi Germany. Many women singled out for compulsory sterili-
sation on eugenic grounds rebelled through so-called Trotzschwangerschaften, 
defiant pregnancies before they were rendered infertile (Mouton 2007, 142). 
During the Second World War thousands of women, many of them young 
agricultural labourers, ignored or defied the decrees introduced to protect 
‘German blood from infiltration’9 which prohibited association between Ger-
man women and prisoners of war and which threatened offenders with penal 
servitude and loss of civic rights. My new research on sexual behaviour in 
Weimar and Nazi Germany has revealed moreover, that many women when 
questioned by the local police or Gestapo had the audacity to stand up for their 
                                                             
8  Bundesarchiv Berlin, R1501, 9347, Bl.45, cited in Usborne 2005, 139. 
9  Report by the Security Service, 1942, cited in Kundrus 2005, 201-222. 
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rights to forge erotic liaisons and some even recounted the happiness they had 
experienced.10 Such agency by women and their partners challenges the re-
ceived opinion that under Hitler the private sphere was comprehensively in-
vaded and destroyed (cf. Herzog 2005) and the regime’s control over the body 
politic and body female was total. It also reminds us how important it is for 
research into biopolitics to take the perceptions and practices of individuals 
seriously, especially of individual women, and to bemoan the fact that it is still 
often largely ignored. 
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